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ABSTRACTS

Mary lane Plumer
APPEARANCE - AUTHORITY OF A CONSUL OF A FOREIGN NATION TO
ELECT ON BEHALF OF H1s ABSENT NATIONAL TO TAKE AGAINST THE WILL
· OF HER DECEASED HusBAND - A treaty between Poland and the United
States provides that "a consular officer ... shall ..• have the right to appear in
all matters concerning the administration and distribution of the estate of a
deceased person ••. for all such heirs or legatees of the said estate • . . as may
be non-residents and nationals of the country represented by the said consular
officer with the same effect as if he held their power of attorney .•." 1 Under
authority of this treaty the Consul General of Poland filed an instrument in
which he purported to exercise on behalf of an absent Polish national, Felicja
Zalewski, the right given her by statute 2 to take her intestate share of her husband's estate in lieu of his bequest to her under the will. The will's only provision for Mrs. Zalewski was a legacy of one hundred dollars, and since the net
amount of the estate was $8,500, consul's election was to the pecuniary advantage of testator's spouse. The executor of the will rejected Mrs. Zalewski's
claim and the consul filed objections in a proceeding by the executor for a final
accounting. .The objections were dismissed in the surrogate court 3 and the
dismissal affirmed in the appellate division. 4 The question to be determined on
appeal is "can the Consul-General of the Republic of Poland, under the existing
treaty .•. without direct authorization by, or communication from, his national
who resides in Poland, validly exercise on her behalf the right accorded her
by [the New York Statute] to 'take against the will' of her late husband?" 5
Held, the order of the appellate division and the decree of the surrogate court,
so far
appealed from should be reversed. Though the right to elect is personal, it is personal only in the sense that the election must, in each case, be a.,
conscious, individually made choice between the statutory provision and the
testamentary provision, and not in the sense that it may not be made by a duly
authorized agent. The consul-general is the duly authorized agent of his absent
national by virtue of the power given him by the treaty to "appear" for her.
This interpretation is in harmony with the common law on the 'nature and
extent of consular authority to represent nationals in our courts. Although there
is no case in which the precise question here involved has been directly passed
upon, it has been held that consuls may come into court to collect property of
their nationals, to collect liquidated debts, or to file objections in the surrogate
court. Any of these actions amounts to the making of an election; in making
it, however, the court will not permit the elector to sacrifice a right of his
national. Lehman, Chief Judge, dissented on the ground that the consul was
not authorized by treaty, or at common law, to make the election. The only
right conferred by the treaty is that to "appear," and there is no indication that

as

I
1

48 Stat. L. 1507 at 1530 (1931).
N.Y., Decedent's Estate Law (McKinney, 1939) c. 13, § 18.
3
177 Misc. 384, N.Y.S. (2d) 658 (1941).
4
256 App. Div. 878, 38 N.Y.S. (2d) 37 (1942).
5
Principal case at 18 5.
2

.
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anything other than that was meant. Authority to "appear" is not authority
to "elect." At common law, the power of consular officers to act for their
nationals was limited to actions for the protection of the rights granted their
nationals by law. He acts not as a personal agent, but in his official capacity
as representative of his government, and his acts are provisional and for the
purpose of preserving the property of his nationals an.d securing for them an
opportunity to assert and maintain their right to do so. In re Zalewski's Estate,
(N.Y. 1944) 55 N.E. 184.
CORPORATIONS - RIGHT OF MINORITY STOCKHOLDER TO RELIEF
AGAINST TRANSFER OF CORPORATION ASSETS TO NEW CORPORATION IN
RETURN FOR STOCK - The Newman Company, defendant corpo.ration, is a
manufacturer and seller of corsets. Having in the process of development a
new surgical garment not suitable to be marketed in the usual.way, its directors
proposed that, in order to facilitate marketing, the business, property, and goods
connected with the manufacture and sale of the new garment be trinsferred to
a separate corporation, the Miles Company, organized for that puipose. The
plan adopted provided that 9349 shares of the common stJck-the number of
shares of Newman Company common stock outstanding--out of _the 10,000
shares of Miles Company stock to be issued, were to be purchased by the Newman Company and distributed among its common stockholders as a dividend,
and that the property transferred be paid for in preferred stock in the new
company. The certificate of incorporation of the Miles Company provides that no
stockholder shall have a right to purchase or subscribe for unissued or additional
stock or bonds or other securities convertible into stock, but that they may be
issued and disposed of by vote of the directors to such persons and upon such
terms as they shall determine. It provides also that any act or contract may
be submitted by the directors for approval to a lawful quorum of the strockhold~rs,
and if a majority of those represented approve, it is binding on the corporation.
Plaintiff is a minority stockholder in the Newman Corporation and a direc- '
tor on its board. His was the only stock voted against the plan. Jae brought
this action for an injunction restraining the defendant corporation and its directors from transferring any of its assets to the Miles Corporation, or in the
· alternative, a judgment that plaintiff is entitled to be paid the value of his stock
in the Newman Company. On appeal from a judgment in defendant's favor,
held, there was error in the proceeding below; the judgment was set aside and a
new trial ordered. The provisions of the certificate of incorporation set forth
• above make the plan inequitable as regards plaintiff. A stockholder i!i in ·general
entitled to a pre-emptive right to subscribe for or purchase addition.al stock in
proportion to his holdings so that he can preserve his proportionate ;part in the
assets and management of the corporation. So long as the Newman Company
carried on the business of manufacturing and selling the Miles garment, plaintiff could retain his proportionate share; but, after the business is transferred to
the Miles Company, whether he will continue to have the same share will
depend upon the will of the directors of that company. This,· added to the fact
that three of the defendants, directors of the Newman Company, are a majority
of the directors of the Miles Company and own a majority of its common stock,
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and any act they do may be validated by their votes as stockholders, makes
apparent "the extent to which the. interest of the plaintiff in the portion of the
business to be transferred to the Miles Company will be subject to the control
of defendant." 1 Klopot v. Northrop, (Conn. 1944) 37 A. (2d) 700.
EVIDENCE-HEARSAY-WHAT CONSTITUTE STATEMENTS MADE IN
EXECUTION OF AGENCY FOR PURPOSES OF EXCEPTING THEM FROM HEARSAY RULE? - In an action to recover damages for injuries sustained in defendant theatre by plaintiff when he sat on a seat wet with a liquid that burned
his body, plaintiff had a verdict in the county court, but on appeal it was reversed on the ground that plaintiff's only evidence of defendant's responsibility
for the wetness of the seat was incompetent and illegally admitted as part of
the res gestae. The evidence consisted of the testimony of the usherette who
sh~wed plaintiff to his seat, of the conversation between herself and the manager
in plaintiff's preSence, in which, on being asked to explain the condition of the
seat, she told the manager that a fluid had been used to get gum off the seat.
On appeal, held, the judgment of the supreme court was reversed, that of the
county court affirmed. The supreme court was correct in not admitting the
evidence as part of the res gestae, but' the evidence was admissible as statements
mad by defendant's agents in the execution of their agency. The manager, here,
in asking questions of the usherette was carrying out his duty to see that the employees were not negligent; the usherette's answers form part of the inquiry
which was being conducted for the benefit of the principal. drenson v. Skouras
Theatres Corporation, (N.J. 1944) 36 A. (2d) 761.1
EVIDENCE - RuLE AGAINST •COMPULSORY SELF-INCRIMINATION - UsE
FEDERAL CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS OF TESTIMONY GIVEN UNDER COMPULSION IN STATE PROCEEDINGS-The case of United States v. Feldman/
which was abstracted in the February issue,2 was reviewed on a writ of certiorari
by the Supreme Court and the conviction affirmed. Feldman v. United States,
(U.S. 1944) 64 S. Ct. 1082.
IN

EVIDENCE -TESTIMONY OF PARTY CALLED AS WITNESS BY OPPOSING
PARTY AS EXPERT TESTIMONY - In an action to recover for the wrongful
death of his son through the negligence of defendant doctors, plaintiff was nonsuited in the court below because there was no expert testimony on the question
of negligence. He"contends that if such testimony is necessary it was present in
the testimony of the defendant, Dr. Costello, whom plaintiff had called as a
witness. Costello had answered questions of fact concerning the actual treatment
of the patient but when plaintiff asked questions intended to elicit information
1

Principal case at 706, 707.

1

See "Agency-Admissibility against the Principal of Statements made against his
Interest by Agent," 3 MoNT. L. REv. 81 (1942).
1
·

2

(C.C.A. 2d, 1943) 136 F. (2d) 394.
42 MtcH. L. REV. 718 (1944).
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as to hypothetical methods of treatment a~d defendant's op1mon concerning
them, objections ,were made and sustained. Held, affirmed. The statute provides that, "except as otherwise provided by law, when any party is called as a
witness by the adverse party he shall be subject to the same rules as to examination and cross-examination as other witnesses." 1 It. is an esta_blished rule as to
examination and cross-examination of witnesses that one cannot be co?lpelled to ·
give expert testimony unless he has contracted to do so; this rule applies as well
toanadversepartycalledasawitness. Hullv.Plume, (N.J. I944) 37A. (2d)

53.
FEpERAL -CouRTS- STATUS OF STAT:& WATER CoNsERVATI@N BoARD
CORPORATE CITIZEN OR AS STATE AGENCY, FOR PURPOSES OF J URISDIOTI0N OF FEDERAL COURT ON DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP BASIS -The State
Water Conservation Board was a defendant in an action by the Mont?J}a Power
Company, a New Jersey Corporation engaged in the business of generating and
distributing electric power in Montana, for an order enjoining appropriation by
the water board of water rights claimed by complainant by prior appropriation,
and a quieting of complainant's title to the use thereof. One of the questions
raised was whether defendant water board is the "alter ego" of the state of.
Montana as it claims, and therefore not suable in the federal'courts, or whether,
as claimed by plaintiff, it is a corporate citizen of the state of M<5ntana and
suable in the federal district court by a New Jersey corporation on the basis of
diversity of citizenship. The act setting up the water board 1 provides that it be
made up of the governor and the state engineer as ex-- officio members, and three
other members appointed by the governor, who are required to take tjhe oath of
state officers and whose compensation is payable from the funds. provided by
legislative appropriation. The object declared in th act is the construction of a
system of works "for the development, storage, distribution and utilization of
water," and the board, in carrying it out, is to be "regarded as performing· a
governmental function." The board is given control over all water in the state
not already appropriated, or under the control of the United States, and is empowered to take such steps as are necessary to appropriate and conserve it; it is
empowereq to issue bonds on which the state is not liable, to exercise the state's
police power, to take title to property purchased or condemned in its name, to
sue and be sued in the state or federal court for certain purposes, and ·tp exercise,
its powers in adjoining states or countries. The water board moved' for a dismissal on the jurisdictional ground .that the suit was in effect against the state
and there was no diverse citizenship, and the court below deQied the motion.
On appeal, held, reversed.· The terms of the statute, and its prior interpretation
by the Montana court 2 leave little doubt that the board is a "mere arm of the
sovereign." Its officers are state officers and it is empowered to perform governmental fu'1ctions. Denman, Circuit Judge, dissents on the groun« that the
majority view is in conflict with the already established view that "where a state
AS

1

N.J. Rev. Stat. (1937) § z:97-12 •

1

Mont. Rev. Code Ann. (Anderson & McFarland, 1935) §§ 349.1-349.38.
State ex rel. Normile v. Cooney, 100 Mont. 391, 47 P. (zd) 637 (1935).

2

•

4
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creates separate corporate entities as its agents to perform governmental functions
and gives such corporate entities the right to sue and be sued and the state's
Supreme Court, construing the laws creating such corporation, determines that
the Legislature has created the corporations to be such separate entities, they are
citizens of the creating state subject to be sued in the federal courts by a citizen
of another state. The Water Conservation Corporation is such a separate entity." 3 Broadwater-Mo. Water Users' Assn. v. Montana Power- Go., (C.C.A.
9th, 1944) 139 F. (2d) 998.
FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES -ANNUITY CONTRACT AS CONSIDERATION
FOR TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY INSOLVENT - In a bill to set aside as a fraud
on creditors an annuity contract issued by defendant to plaintiff's decedents,
plaintiff alleged that decedents, while insolvent, transferred to defendant $5,500
in exchange for an annuity contract by the terms of which defendant undertook
to pay to Edward Webster- a monthly income for the rest of his life, and after
:, his death to continue the payments to his wife if she should survive him; and
that the money was transferred to defendants without consideration and was
fraudulent as to the Websters' creditors. Defendants demurred and the court
. below sustained the demurrer. Held, affirmed. When a conveyance is made by
one who is insolvent and, as here, it is not alleged that defendant knew of or
participated in the fraudulent purpose, the law of Massachusetts is that the
conveyance is fraudulent as to creditors, without regard to the intent of the
one making it, if made "without a fair consideration." 1 Fair consideration is
given "when in exchange for such property or obligation, as a fair equivalent
therefor, and in good faith, property is conveyed or an antecedent debt is satisfied.m Defendant's policy delivered in exchange for decedent's $5,500 was a
"non-negotiable chose in action" and was "property" within the meaning of
the statute. Such a contract has previously been held in this state to be "fair
consideratiQ.IJ.." Osgood v. Massachusetts Mutual Life Ins. Go., (N.H. 1944)
37 A. (2d) 12.
LABOR LAW - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT- DuTY OF EMPLOYER TO BARGAIN WITH UNION CERTIFIED BY N.L.R.B. AFTER MAJORITY
OF EMPLOYEES HAVE REPUDIATED IT As THEIR BARGAINING AGENT-Ten
weeks after the National Labor Relations Board had certified a local of the
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers as the exclusive bargaining
agent of defendant's employees, a majority of the employees signed a petition
expressing their desire to cease to be so represented. The company thereafter
refused to bargain with the union. The board, found that defendant had violated
section 8 (I) and (5) of the act 1 by refusing to bargain with the union after
3
Principal case at 1002. Judge Denman cited as authority Louisia~a Highway
Commission v. Farnsworth, 74 F. (2d) 910 (1935) and Port of Seattle v. Oregon &
W.R. Co., 255 U.S. 56, 41 S. Ct. 237 (1921).
-

1
2

1

Mass. Ann. Laws (Michie, 1943) c. 419, § 4.
Id. at § 3.
•
29 U.S.C.A. (1940) § 158.
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its designation as exclusive bargaining agent, and in certain other respects, and
it petitions this court to enforce its order based on this finding. Held, the board's
finding that defendant was guilty of unfair labor practices other than its refusal
to bargain with the union was not supported by the evidence, but it properly
found that the company was not justified in its refusal to so bargain. "To assume
that the Board's certification speaks with certainty only for the day of issuance
and that a Company may, with impunity, at any time thereafter refuse to bargain collectively on the ground that a change of sentiment has diveste~ the duly
certified representative of its majority status would lead to litigious bedlam and
judicial chaos • . • . Since the Act does not prescribe the length· or time for
which any given certification shall remain valid, the court accepts. the legal
conclusion of the Board that the Company must recognize the certmed representative for a reasonable period of time after issuance of the certification, or
until the certification is either set aside or replaced by the appropriate action of
the Board in accord with the Act." 2 The board properly found that a reasonable time had not elapsed. It is directed that the sections of the order which
require the company to bargain collectively with the union be enforced.3 Na,tional Labor Relations Board v. Appalachian Electric Power Co., (C.C.A. 4th,
1944) 140 F. (2d) 217.4,
LABOR LAW - NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT - EFFECT OF DELAY
BY BoARD ON VALIDITY OF BtAcK PAY ORDER - LuMP SuM METHOD OF
COMPUTING BACK PAY-On the basis of a finding that respondent had been
guilty of unfair labor practices, the result of which was a strike in its plants, the
N.L.R.B. ordered respondent to reinstate all employees named in sch.edule "A"
and to contribute back pay from the time of its discrimination against union: ·
men to the time of reinstatement, or offer of reinstatement, to their former status
as employees, without regard to whether they would have been eny>loyed for
that period had there been no discrimination. Respondent contends first that it
was unconscionable to require it to contribute back pay up to the time of compliance with the board's order for the reason that the hearing before the board
did not take place for four years after the strike, and the board's decision was
not delivered until a year after the hearing. Secondly, it contends that, since
the evidence shows a reduced employment in respondent's plant after the strike,
due to the lack of work and the installation of labor saving devices, the board
should have adopted the trial examiner's recommendation, which provided that
all employees named in schedule "A" be reinstated or placed on a preferential list
and that a lump sum should be computed consisting of all wages paid to e~ch such
employee prior to the strike, less his net earnings during the period, lfe'/4, order
amended by substituting the examiner's recommendation with regard to computing back pay for employees listed in schedule "A" and enforcement of
2

Principal case at 221, 222.
Judge Soper dissented on the ground that in such a proceeding it was within the
power of the court to look into the determination of the bargaining agent, and. that
the unit here had been designated on inadequate grounds.
4, Principal case noted in 30 VA. L. REv. 344 (1944). See Boudin, "The; Author~
ity of the National War Labor Board Over Labor Disputes," supra 329 at 352 et seq.
8
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amended order decreed. The back pay order was not invalid because of the
long delay in proceedings before the board. Since the statute contains no time
limit mandate for the rendering of a decision by the board; this court can grant
no relief from the hardships caused by delay. B¥t with respect to the board's.
order for the compution of back pay, it was "clearly punitive rather than compensatory, and beyond the power of the board to make since its functions are
preventative and remedial only. It has no power to exact retribution." 1 Although the examiner's formula does not achieve mathematical precision in the
restoration of lost compensation in that it fails to distinguish between men with
greater and those with lesser seniority, in view of the fact" situation, it fairly
achieves equitable distribution. National Labor Relations Board v. American
Creosoting Co., Inc., (C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 139 F. (2d) 193.2

1

NEW TRIAL-APPEAL AND ERROR-EXISTENCE AND EXTENT OF INHERENT OR CONSTITUTIONAL POWER OF COURTS TO GRANT A NEW TRIAL
OR ALLOW AN APPEAL - In a suit by appellee on an insurance contract, the
judgment was adverse to appellant, his motion for a new trial was overruled,
and leave was granted him to file a bill of exceptions. When it was discovered
on the last day of tl:ie term that the court stenographer's notes had been lost, the
judge, in order that further search might be made for the notes, vacated his
order overruling appellant's motion for a new trial and instructed the clerk to
make an entry to that e:ffec.t. After the time for filing a bill of exceptions had
gone by, appellant discovered that the entry had not been made by the clerk,
and he thereupon requested the cle'rk to make tlie entry, which the clerk did.
Appellee moved to have the entry expunged from the record and appellant, in
response, petitioned to have the motion denied or, in the alternative, to be
granted a new trial "under such circumstances that its right of appeal will be
protected and safeguarded." The court granted appellee's motion and found
against appellant on his petition. Appellant moved for a new trial on its petition
and here assigns as error the overruling of that motion. Held, reversed with
instructions to deny appellee's motion to expunge from the record the order
setting aside the ruling on the motion for a new trial; and to grant appellant a
reasonable time to file a bill of exceptions from the reporter's notes if available,
or if not available, to submit one agreed upon by the parties, or if a suitable bill
is not available by either method, to grant a new trial: In so holding the court
said that it was clearly committed to the doctrine "that courts have jurisdiction
to grant new trials beyond the statute and that the right to an appeal does not
depend upon a statute." 1 For authority the court relied upon cases where courts
had exercised general equity jurisdiction to grant new trials because of inability
to'perfect the record for appeal, and upon a provision in the Indiana Constitution
that "All courts shall be open; and e\'.ery man, fo: injury done to him in his

.

.

1

Principal case at 196.
On the question of delay in the proceedings, see 28 GEORGETOWN L. J. I 102
(1940). On question of computation of back pay, see 29 GEORGETOWN L. J. 580
(1941). On both questions, see 37 ILL. L. REv. 441 (1943).
2

1

Principal case at 342.
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person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law." 2 Indianapolis Life Ins. Co. v. Lundquist, (Ind. 1944) 53 N.E. (2d) 338.8
•
RECEIVERS - ACTIVE DuTY OF RECEIVER APPOINTED TO CoLLECT
RENTS AND PROFITS TO GET BEST PRICE FOR PROPERTY AT FORECLOSURE
SALE - EFFECT OF FEE-SPLITTING AGREEMENT BETWEEN ATTORNEY AND
RECEIVER - One Simkins was appointed co-receiver by the federal district
court, at the request of mortgagor's creditors, to operate and receiv.e the rents
and profits from· eleven farms on which mortgages aggregating $ I 92,000 were
being foreclosed by The Prudential Insurance Company of America. Shortly
before the foreclosure sale he learned that there was a buyer who was willing to
purchase the farms as a unit and agreed with the prospective 1;,uyer's agent to
assist in procuring the title after Prudential bought it at public sale, ~is compensation to depend upon his success in making the deal. Simkins told the co;urt
only that "there might be some parties" interested in the farms as a unit but
was told that they could not be sold that way. Before the sale Si_mkins knew
the terms of the offer and that the prospective buyer was Col. Proctor of Cincinnati, but he did not disclose to the court these facts nor the fact of his
employment. Prudential bought the farms at the foreclosure sale for $163,900
and resold them two days later to Col. Proctor for $249,106, Simkiris receiving
$2,797 from Proctor's agent for his services. Petitioner, a corporation formed
by mortgagor's creditors, contends that this conduct on Simkins' part constituted
a breach of his duty as receiver and rendered him accountable for ( a) the pr9fit
which he received from the agent, (b) the commission or profit received by the
agent, and ( c) the amount received by Prudential in excess of the ·decree indebtedness or, in the alternative, the amount by which the appraised value of
the farms exceeded the decree indebtedness. In answer, respondents claim that
Simkins was appointedf only to collect rents and profits and that· he had no
fiduciary duty with respect to the foreclosure sale. Petitioner also contends that
Simkins should be surcharged with all his ·receivership fees because of a feesplitting agreement between himself and the attorneys represen~ing Prudential
and the co-receivers, by which the fees of the three were to be pooled and divided
equally among them. The district court found against petitioner and the circuit
court of appeals affirmed.1 Certiorari was granted "to determine certain important questions concerning the proper administration of federal receiverships}' 2
Held, reversed and remanded. Although Simkins' duty as co-receiver was
limited to managing the property, he was nevertheless ah arm of the 'court. The
court's authority and duties extended to the conservation and liquidation of the
farm properties and all the court officers were "bound to act fairly and openly
· 2

Ind. Const., Art. 1, § 12.
For collection of cases involving power of court of equity to grant a new trial
because of inability to perfect the record see 13 A.L.R. 102 (1921), 16 A.L.R. 1158
(1922), IO A.L.R. 603 (1921).
On denial of appeal for want of statutory authorization see 148 A.L.R. 1208
(1944).
8

1
2

(C.C.A. 6th, 1943) 134 F. (2d) 925.
Principal case at 1077.
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with respect to every aspect of the proceedings before the court." 3 Since the
course taken by Simkins was inconsistent with his position as officer of the court
in that it tended to dampen the foreclosure sale, and resulted in profits to himself, he is accountable for, those profits, consisting of the amount paid him by
Col. Proctor's agent. He is not, however, accountable for the profit of the agent.
Simkins should also be surcharged with the receiver's fees. Normally, whether
parties to a fee-splitting contract should be allowed any fees is within the discretion of the court, but here, "the fact that Simkins entered int9 a fee-splitting
contract so patently illegal, plus the fact that he engaged in other misconduct
and indiscretions incompatible with his position as an officer of the court, compel
the conclusion that all fees and compensation as co-receiver should have been
denied him." 4 Crites Inc. v. Prudential, Insurance Co. of America, (U.S.
1944) 64 S. Ct. 1075.5
TORTS--NEGLIGENCE-LIABILITY OF STOREKEEPER FOR INJURY TO
CHILD WHO PUTS FINGER IN COFFEE GRINDER - In an action for damages
incurred when three-year old Janice Crane stuck her finger into defendant's
coffee grinder, the trial court found that the coffee grinder was particularly
dangerous and attractive to a child of three, that such child was too young to
appreciate the danger,, which fact was known or should have been known to
defendant, and that in the light of such circumstances defendant was negligent
in placing the coffee grinder in the aisle of a "self serve" market and as a proximate result of such negligence, Janice Crane sustained the injury complained
of. The court also found that defendant was negligent in not providing proper
safeguards for the coffee grinder. Defendant contends, on appeal from judgment
in plaintiff's favor, that Janice was a mere licensee or trespasser and defendant's
duty was only to refrain from actively injuring her, or ev~ if she was an invitee,
defendant's negligence has not been established, or if established was not the
proximate cause of the injury. Held, affirmed. A possessor of land, when he
knows of a condition on his land which will expose business visitors to an unreasonable risk which they are not likely to discover, is under a duty to exercise
reasonable care to warn them of the danger, or make the condition reasonably
safe for their use. Since children have less ability to recognize and capacity to
avoid danger than adults, the possessor of land owes them a higher degree of care
than he owes to adults, and in determining that degree of care one of the circumstances to be taken into consideration is their "childish propensities to intermeddle." Janice was an invitee because she accompanied one who came on
business, and she did not lose that status by putting her fingers into the coffee
grinder, for the act should reasonably have been anticipated. The trial court's
finding that the coffee mill was dangerous and attractive to children is supported by the evidence. The invitee was subjected to an unreasonable risk, for
the defendant might have accomplished his purpose equally well by placing his
mill behind the counter. The intervening act of Janice, putting her finger in
3

Id. at 1079.
Id. at 1081.
5
On the rights, powers and duties of a receiver, see "Mortgage Receiverships in
Iowa," 27 lowA L. REv. 626 at 636 (1942).
4
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the machine, does not relieve appellant of liability because it is an act which
should have been anticipated; nor would he have been relieved by c0ntributory
negligence on the part of Mrs. Crane. Crane 'lJ. Smith, (Cal. 1944) 144 P.

(2d) 356.
TRUSTS--LIABILITY FOR PARTICIPATION IN A BREACH OF TRUs'I'--Plaintiffs, beneficiaries of the estate of Arwilda Mudge, brought this action against
defendant stockbrokers for an accounting for the alleged conversion of certain
stock certificates, representing stock of the Liberty National Bank, belonging to
the estate. The certificates, with other securities, had been conveyed by Mrs.
Mudge to her son Burton under a trust agreement of March 4, I 920, the trust
to come' to an end at the death of the settlor and the trust property to be conveyed at that time to settlor's executor to be distributed as part of her estate.
Subsequently, this agreement was superseded by a second one substantially the
same. The Liberty National Bank having merged, in the meantime with the
New York Trust Company, the latter sent a certificate in the name of Burton.
Mudge, trustee under the March 4 agreement, for sixty-eight shares ,of stock in
the New York Trust Company. After settlor's death, the trustee irrdorsed the
certificate to himself individually and delivered it to defendants with the request .
that they guarantee the signature and send it to the New York Trust Company,
which defendants did. At the request of the trust company, a copy of the trust
agreement was then sent to defendant, accompanied by a letter stating that the
transfer was desired in order to simplify the handling of the securities. The
new certificates were issued and delivered to the trustee except for twenty-seven
shares which defendants sold at the trustee's request and deposited the proceeds
therefrom to the account of Mudge, trustee. The unsold certificates were
pledged by the trustee to secure the .indebtedness of a corporation which he
controlled. The ground on which plaintiffs seek recovery is that when defendants
assisted. the trustee in having the certificate transferred to himself oy guaranteeing the signature of the certificate, and forwarding it to New York for
transfer, with notice that the stock had been issued in the name of the trustee,
they participated in the transfer, conversion, and breach of trust and became
just as liable as the person who made the transfer and as the trustee· who converted the money. For authority, they rely on the bank cases where trust funds
were deposited and credited to the individual account of the trustee and used
by him for his own purposes under such circumstances that the bank1 with full
knowledge of the breach of trust, facilitated the conversion of trust funds, and
thereby became a participator in the conversion. The lower court dismissed the
petition. Held, affirmed. This case does not fall within the rule of the bank
cases in that here there is nothing comparable to knowledge of or notice to the
bank that the trustee intends to misapply the funds. Further, the acts of defendant were not, as plaintiff claims, instrumental in bringing about loss to the
plaintiffs. Defendants guaranteed only the genuineness of the signature, not
'that the agreement was still in force. Mudge 'lJ. Mitchell Hutchins & Co.,

(Ill. 1944) 54 N. E. (2d) 708.1
1

For liability of banks for participation in breaches of trust see 42 MrcH. L. REV.
694 (1944); 89 UNiv. PA. L. REv. 254 (1940); 148 A.L.R. 926 at 936 (1944),
145 A.L.R. 445 (1943).
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TRUSTS-POWER OF COURT OF EQUITY TO SELL LAND AND SET UP A
TRUST OF PROCEEDS WHERE FUTUR:t;: INTERESTS INVOLVEo--By the terms of
the will of her husband, defendant Josephine Beliveau took a life estate in all
his property, coupled with the right of sale and disposition and the right to use
the proceeds of any sale for her comfort and support, with remainder over to
his brothers and sisters, plaintiffs here. The will contained the provision that
in case the profits;rents, and income from his property should be "sufficient to
properly care for, support and maintain my said wife, tlien I prefer that my real
estate be kept intact." The husband's estate, on his death, consisted of 320 acres
of farm land, eighty acres of which constituted decedent's homestead, and certain
_cash and personalty. The land other than the homestead was mortgaged by
decedent's executor under authority of the probate court. Defendant has permitted the buildings and fences to fall into disrepair, has failed to keep the
~uildings insured, and has permitted quack grass, thistle, and other weeds to
infest and depreciate the farm. The farm other than the homestead was sold
under execution and defendant has made no attempt to redeem; nor has she
taken any steps to redeem from a foreclosure sale for her default in failing to
. _pay interest on the mortgage debt and taxes. In an action by the remaindermen
the court below, on these facts, appointed a trustee to preserve the property for
the life tenant and remaindermen in accordance with the express wish of the
testator, and empowered him t~ sell the property at the earliest possible date, to
mortgage it pending the sale to raise funds to redeem from the execution and
mortgage, to rent the property and collect the rents pending the sale, to deposit
the proceeds of the sale and disburse them according to the order of the court,
holding that part remaining after payment of taxes, mortgage debt, judgment
debt, and fees for the support of Josephine Beliveau during her lifetime, and
paying, at her death, any remaining portion to plaintiffs. Under this order, the
land including the homestea~ was mortgaged and disbursement made according
to the order of the court. She appeals from the-part of the order under which
the homestead was sold, and the proceeds peld and administered by a trustee, on
· the ground that under her power to sell and encroach upon the corpus, she has
an absolute right of disposition of the land or proceeds of sale, and as an incident
thereto the entire management of the estate, including discretion to decide if
there should be a sale in whole or in part of the lands and to what extent she
should use the proceeds. Held, affirmed. Under the Minnesota statute,1 in a
case where, as here, there is no trust but plaintiff is given a life estate coupled
with a power to sell and use so much of the proceeds as may be necessary for
her support, as between tenant and remaindermen, the tenant has a conventional
life estate coupled with a power of disposition with a remainder over. She has
the power of disposition for ordinary comfort and support but by implication
she is quasi trustee for the remainderman in the sense that she cannot injure
or dispose of the property to the injury of the remainderman. "Where, because
of an exigency endangering the rights of the owners of property given in present
and future interests, it is necessary to preserve the property and to protect such
interests, courts have inherent equitable jurisdiction to order a judicial sale of
the entire fee, and to appoint a trustee to conduct the sale and to reinvest the
proceeds of the sale for the benefit of the holders of the respective interests in the

1944]

RECENT DECISIONS

43 1

property sold •••• Neither the absence of an express trust in the instrument
creating the present and future interests nor of statutory author,izatiQn f9>r -the
judicial creation of a trust in such cases is any obstacle to such relief." 2 Belimeau
v. Belimeau, (Minn. 1944) 14 N. W. (2d) 360.
WILLs--WHETHER INSTRUMENT DESIGNATED AS "AFFIRMATION OF
GIFT" MAY BE PROBATED As A WILL-In an instrument entitled "Affirmation of Gift" testator, a childless widow, purported to give all her property to her
four brothers; one to receive five dollars, "in addition to gifts already made to
him in the past" and the other three to have equal shares in the remainder.
There were two witnesses to testator's signature and, though the instrument was
nowhere called a will and did not contain a testamentary clause, it was admitted
to probate by the trial court. Contestants claim that the instrument is not testamentary in character and was not legally executed because the decedent is not
shown to have known its contents or to have asked attesting witn~ to act as
witnesses to a will. They seek to have established, rather, another will of the
testator made at a prior date and providing for the division of the property equally
among the brothers who should survive her. Held, affirmed. Since the facts are
agreed upon, the question before the court is whether as a matter of law the trial
court's conclusion is justified. The court determines whether or not a document
is testamentary in character by looking to the language and to circ}lmstances, if
necessary. Here, although the language does not establish it, the· circumstances
do. It could not have been a gift or conveyance for want of deliv.ery. It was
properly witnessed and Femained in the possession of the testatrix; it disposed of
all her property and amended the terms of her former will by cutting down the
share of a brother who had, in. the meantime, received his.
As to the formalities, testator, having formally executed, cannot be assumed
to have been ignorant of the terms of the instrument~ It wasn't uecessary that
witnesses knew that it was a will they were attesting. In re Mat~s Es-tote,
(Iowa 1943) 12 N.W. (2d) 162.
1
2

Minn. Stat. (1941) § 502.09.
Principal case at 365.

